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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UT A H ,
Plaintiff/Respondent

/
/

vs

/

CaseNo20010462-CA

KELLY GARNER

/

judge

Defendant/Appellant

/

Priority No 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a conditional plea of guilty before the Honorable Parley
R. Baldwin of four counts of burglary, in violation of Section 76-6-202 U. C. A. all
third degree felonies.
The basis of the Defendant's appeal is that the Defendant was denied the
right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

STATE OF UTAH V GARNER
Case Number 2 0 0 1 0 4 6 2 - C A
This denial of the right to a speedy trial was caused by the State's failure to file a
timely detainer.. On April 19, 2 0 0 1 , the Defendant pled guilty on a conditional
plea to the four burglary charges, and the Trial Court accepted the plea and
reserved the Defendant's right to appeal its decision on the denial of Defendant's
Motion to Suppress and Dismiss. The Defendant was sentenced on May 10, 2001
to serve an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State prison on
each of the four felonies. These terms were ordered to be served concurrently and
to run concurrently with the case pending in Alabama..
The notice of appeal was filed with the Court on the 24 th Day of May,
2 0 0 1 . The Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to U.C.A. Sec 78-2a-3
Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES A N D STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the Court commit reversible error when it ruled that
statements of the Defendant and evidence obtained by a
search of the Defendant would not be suppressed?

STANDARD OF
REVIEW
The factual finding underlying a trial court's decision to deny a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard,

l
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and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. State v.
O'Brien. 9 5 9 P 2 nd 6 4 7 , 6 4 8 (Utah App 1998), State v. Truiillo 2001 UT App
147 (Utah App 2 0 0 1 )
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by information with four counts of burglary in
violation of Section 76-6-202 UCA, third degree felonies, three counts of theft in
violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA , second degree felonies, two counts of
criminal mischief in violation of Section 76-6-106 UCA, second degree felonies
and one count of theft, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of Section 76-6-404UC
A. On January 4, 2001 the Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and entered
pleas of not guilty.
On January 2 5 , 2001 the Defendant through his appointed counsel
informed the Court that he would file a motion to dismiss the informations on the
speedy trial grounds. The Court heard the Defendant's motion to dismiss on
February 2 2 , 2 0 0 1 . The basis of the motion was that the State obtained a full and
complete statement of the co-defendant on May 5, 1998 and that the informations
against the Defendant were not filed until June, 1999. During the one year plus

2

STATE OF UTAH V GARNER
Case Number 2 0 0 1 0 4 6 2 - C A
period the State had an opportunity to talk to the Defendant, but did not contact
the Defendant. In the meantime the defendant's mother died and the Defendant
alleges that she would have provided an alibi for the Defendant at the times of the
alleged offenses.

The Defendant argued that because his mother, who would testify in his
behalf died during the delay this was actual prejudice, and because the Defendant
had not been charged, he could not invoke his right to a speedy trial. Further, to
prove negligence on the part of the State, it knew that the Defendant was in prison
in Colorado, and yet did not file a detainer. Then the Defendant went to prison in
Alabama, and when he was ready to get paroled only then the State filed in
Alabama a detainer against the Defendant.
On March 2 2 , 2001 the Court ruled that the Defendant's case does not fall
into the category of violation of speedy trial and therefore, the Court denied the
motion. On April 19, 2001 the Defendant pled guilty to four counts of burglary,
third degree felonies, and all other counts will be dismissed. In making the plea, the
Defendant reserved his right to appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress
the evidence.

3
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FACTS
By information, the Defendant was charged with four counts of burglary, in
violation of Section 76-6-202 UCA, third degree felonies, three counts of theft in
violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA, second degree felonies, two counts of criminal
mischief, in violation of Section 76-6-106 UCA, third degree felonies and one
count of theft in violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor. ( T
December 2 2 , 2 0 0 0 Hearing pg's 1 -2) At that hearing the Weber County Public
Defenders Association entered as counsel for the Defendant. ( T. December 2 2 ,
2 0 0 0 Hearing, p. Z)
The Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing on January 4, 2001
and the Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to all counts. ( T. January 4, 2001
Hearing pg's 1 -3) The next hearing was held on January 2 5 , 2001 at which
hearing counsel for the Defendant moved to strike the trial date as he was filing a
Motion to Dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. ( T January 2 5 , 2001 Hearing,
P. D
A hearing was held on the Defendant's motion to dismiss on February 2 2 ,
2 0 0 1 . At that hearing counsel for the Defendant argued that on May 5, 1998 the
State obtained a full, fairly complete statement from the alleged co-defendant,
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which was basically the main evidence against the Defendant. The State delayed
filing the informations until June, 1999 (February 2 2 , 2001 Hearing p. 1) During
the period of May, 1998 to June, 1999 the Defendant's mother died and the
Defendant alleges that she would have been able to provide the Defendant with an
alibi. The Defendant claims his mother would have testified that couldn't have
done these crimes because he was visiting with her and that he was never out late at
night when the crimes occurred. ( T. February 22, 2001 Hearing pg's 1 -2)
Based on the mother's alleged testimony the delay was an actual prejudice to
the Defendant's defense. Counsel for the Defendant then argued that under the
United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Dogget v United States 505
U.S. 6 4 7 , 120 L Ed 2nd 5 2 0 , 112 S. Ct 2 6 8 6 (1992) that there was a sufficient
violation of his rights. This case held in pre 1980 cases the Court's required the
Defendant to show actual prejudice to prevail on a due process claim, whereas now
the Court held that delay itself was sufficient to violate the due process clause.. As
for a speedy trial you now to prevail do not have to show that the State
intentionally delayed the trial to get gain. ( T. February 2 2 , 2001 Hearing p. 2)
Counsel for the Defendant argued that the State knew everything they
needed approximately a year plus before they filed. This delay constituted both

5
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negligence and actual prejudice to the Defendant because he could not invoke his
right to a speedy trial until the State filed informations against him. Further, as soon
as the Defendant received copies of the informations, he filed his 180 day
disposition on detainers, and then the State waited another three months before
they actually returned the Defendant to Utah. The State never offered an excuse as
to why they didn't file a detainer. ( T. February 2 2 , 2001 Hearing pg's. 4-5) The
Defendant closed his argument by submitting that the State denied Mr. Garner his
right to a speedy trial and also submitted that they denied him his right to due
process on the pre-indictment delay. ( T. February 2 2 , 2001 Hearing p. 6)
The State countered the argument by the Defendant by stating that the
public prosecutor is not compelled to file charges as soon as there is probable cause
to do so. Further, the State was aware that the Defendant was incarcerated in
Colorado and was investigating what was necessary to return him to Utah. (T.
February 2 2 , 2001 Hearing pg's 6-7) The State then argued that it was not an
egregious period of time between the commencement of the investigation in May of
'98 and the filing of the information in May of ' 9 9 . The State claimed that the
death of the Defendant's witness would not have made any difference because the
witness was already deceased. (T February 22 2001 Hearing pg's 7-9) The State
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conceded that the delay in filing a detainer between ]une of 1999 and August,
2 0 0 0 was simply negligence, dereliction, and whatever. ( T. February 2 2 , 2001
Hearing p. 9)
Counsel for the Defendant attempted to distinguish this case from Dogget. In
that case the Government did not know where the Defendant was. In this case the
State knew at all times where the Defendant was incarcerated. (T. February 2 2 ,
2001 Hearing p. 19)
On March 22,2001 the Court ruled that under the Beman case that dockets
can cause delays. Therefore, the Judge ruled that this case does not fall into the
category of violation of speedy trial and therefore the Judge denied the motion. (
T. March 2 2 , 2001 Hearing pg's 1-2) Both the State and the Defendant stipulated
that there was approximately a twenty month delay in this case. ( T. March 2 2 ,
2001 Hearing p. 4)
On April 19, 2001 the Defendant in open court pled guilty to four counts
of burglary, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining six counts. The
Defendant reserved the right to appeal the Court's denial of the Defendant's motion
to dismiss based on the speedy trial issue. (T. April 19, 2001 Hearing pg's 1 -3, 5)
At a May 10, 2001 Hearing the Court sentenced the Defendant to serve four
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concurrent terms at the Utah State Prison, to run concurrent with the sentence the
Defendant Is serving In Alabama. (T. May 10, 2001 Hearing pg's 1 -2)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss based on the fact that the State denied the Defendant due
process of law and the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7,
of the Utah Constitution. It failed to file informations and detainers for some
twenty months after the events occurred, where at all times the State knew where
the Defendant was housed.
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS
THE CHARGES AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AS GUARANTEED
BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEEN
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Amendment VI of the United States Constitution provides as follows:

8
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"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense."
Amendment XIV, Part 1 of the United States Constitution provides as
follows:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law."
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
" No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Doggett v United States
505 US 6 4 7 , 120 L. Ed 2d 520, 112 S Ct. 2 6 8 6 (1992) considered the issue of
when a violation of the Defendant's right to a speedy trial caused a dismissal of the
charges. In the Doggett case the Defendant was indicted on federal drug charges in
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February, 1990. The DEA determined that the Defendant was imprisoned in
Panama and therefore requested that he be expelled back to the United States.
Once the DEA determined that the Defendant left Panama for Columbia it made
no further attempt to locate him. In 1992 the Defendant reentered the United
States, earned a college degree, found employment and lived openly under his own
name. In 1988, while doing a simple check on outstanding warrants the U. S.
Marshall's service located the Defendant and arrested him in 1988.
Upon arrest the Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the
Government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial. The Magistrate found the delay between Doggett's indictment
and arrest was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial," that the delay was
"clearly [was] attributable to the negligence of the government, that Doggett would
not be faulted for any delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial, there being no
evidence that he had known of the charges against him until his arrest. The
Magistrate also found, however, that Dogget had made no affirmative showing that
the delay impaired his ability to mount a successful defense or had otherwise
prejudiced him. The Trial Court based this on the recommendation of the
Magistrate who denied Doggett's motion. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty
plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (a)(2), expressly reserving the
10
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right to appeal his ensuing conviction on the speedy trial claim. A spit panel of the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that Court's had limited the broad sweep of the
Sixth Amendment by specifically recognizing the relevance of four separate
enquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, whether, in
due course, the Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he
suffered prejudice as the delay's result. Barker, supra 33 L Ed 2 nd 1 0 1 , 92 S Ct
218 The Court expressly held that the Defendant need not invoke his speedy trial
right until after his arrest. Doggett, supra at 529.
The Court then considered that the Defendant must show affirmatively how
he was prejudiced by the delay between his indictment and trial. The Court stated
at 5 2 9 - 5 3 0 , supra that it had observed in prior cases that unreasonable delay
between formal accusation and trial threatens to produce more than one sort of
harm, including "oppressive pretrial incarceration," "anxiety and concern of the
accused," and "the possibility that the [accused's] defenses will be impaired" by
dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. Of these forms of prejudice
"the most serious is the last" because of the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." The government argued
n
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the proposition that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect a criminal
defendant's interest in fair adjudication. In so arguing, the Government asks us, in
effect, to read part of Barker right out of law, and that we will not do.
The Court concluded that it recognized that excessive delay presumptively
compromised the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for
that matter, identify. The Court, in reversing Doggett conditional plea stated the
condoning of prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize
many defendants for the state's fault and simply encourage the government to
gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority.
This Court in the case of State v. Russell 2 0 0 0 Ut App 359 (Utah App
2 0 0 0 ) considered the issue of whether an eight month delay was sufficiently
egregious to trigger the speedy trial right. The Court held that the delay of eight
months was not egregious, where the delay was caused in large part by the
Defendant's own acts. The same result was held by this Court in the case of State v
Lewa 9 8 6 P 2d 9 1 0 (Utah App. 1995) where the Defendant failed to meet his
appointment with APscP, and while on probation in Utah was incarcerated in
another state. The Court held that the Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay
in sentencing. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. lensen 818 P 2d
551 (Utah 1991) came to the same conclusion where the Defendant instigated the
12
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delay.
In this case the State basically obtained a full and complete statement from
the co-defendant on May 5, 1998, that clearly implicated the Defendant in the
crime. The Statement was some twenty plus pages The State delayed filing the
information until ]une of 1999. In the meantime the Defendant's mother died.
The Defendant informed his counsel that had the Defendant's mother been alive in
June, 1999 she would have testified that the Defendant could not have done these
crimes because he was there visiting at her house at the times these crimes were
occurring. ( T. February 2 2 , 2001 Hearing pg's 1-2)
During the long period the State was able to find the Defendant because he
was first incarcerated in the Davis County jail, then incarcerated in Colorado and
lastly in Alabama. At all times prior to the indictment the State, with little effort,
would have been able to talk to the Defendant. While incarcerated in Alabama the
State sent a detainer to Alabama. When the Defendant was eligible for parole,
Alabama refused to consider his parole because of the detainer from Utah.
Even though the United States Supreme Court in Doggett, supra stated there
was no need to show actual prejudice caused by the delay, the Defendant showed
actual prejudice in two instances, the death of his mother, a potential alibi witness
and the failure to obtain a parole in Alabama. The State offered no excuse for the
13
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delay in filing the information, and there was no evidence the delay was caused by
any action of the Defendant.
Thus under the ruling of Doggett, supra the Defendant, by the actions of the
State, was denied his right of a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The actions of the State in delaying the filing of an indictment until ]une of
1999, where the Defendant showed actual prejudice by the death of his mother in
the intervening period and the failure of his obtaining parole in Alabama by reason
of the State filing a detainer with Alabama, deprived the Defendant of the right to a
speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The Trial Judge
committed committed reversible error when he ruled that the actions of the State
did not trigger the Speedy Trial rights.
DATED this^th of November, 2001
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ADDENDUM

1

OGDEN, UTAH - DECEMBER 22, 2000

2

ROGER S. DUTSON PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

COURT CLERK:

The State of Utah vs. Kelly Lafe

5

Garner, case number 991902255.

6

and correct name?

7

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

8

COURT CLERK:

Is Kelly Lafe Garner your true

Count 1 reads on or about the 2 6th day

9 I of March, 1998, in Weber County State of Utah, you've been
10 | charged with committing a third degree felony to wit burglary.
11

Do I need to read the body?

12

THE COURT: No.

13

COURT CLERK:

Okay.

Count 2 reads on or about the

14

26th day of March 1998, in Weber County, State of Utah, you've

15

been charged with committing a second degree felony to wit:

16

theft.

17

in Weber County, State of Utah, you've been charged with

18

committing a third degree felony to wit: criminal mischief.

19

Count 4 reads on or about the 19th day of February 1998, in

20

Weber County, State of Utah, you've been charged with

21

committing a third degree felony to wit: burglary.

22

reads on or about the 19th day of February 1998, in Weber

23

County, State of Utah, you've been charged with committing a

24

second degree felony to wit: theft.

25

between November 20, 1997, and November 21, 1997, in Weber

Count 3 reads on or about the 26th day of March 1998,

Count 5

Count 6 reads on or

1

County, State of Utah, you've been charged with committing a

2

third degree felony to wit: burglary.

3

between November 20, 1997, and November 21, 1997, in Weber

4

County, State of Utah, you've been charged with committing a

5

second degree felony to wit: theft.

6

the 28th day of November, 1997, in Weber County, State of Utah,

7

you've been charged with committing a third degree felony to

8

wit: burglary.

9

November, 1997, in Weber County, State of Utah, you've been

Count 7 reads on or

Count 8 reads on or about

Count 9 reads on or about the 28th day of

10

charged with committing a third degree felony to wit: criminal

11

mischief.

12

1997, in Weber County, State of Utah, you've been charged with

13

committing a Class B Misdemeanor to wit: theft.

14

Count 10 reads on or about the 28*"^ day of November,

THE COURT: All right.

These third degree felonies

15 I each carry a - do you waive further reading of the information?
16

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

17 I

THE COURT:

The third degree felonies carry a maximum

18

penalties of zero to five years in prison, up to a $5,000 fine

19

on each, and the second degree felonies each carry maximum

20

penalties of one to fifteen years in prison, up to a $10,000

21

fine on each and the Class B Misdemeanor carries a maximum

22

penalty of up to six months in jail and a $1,000 fine and the

23

misdemeanor will follow the felonies. OYou can hire your own

24

attorney or if you are indigent, the public defender would be

25

appointed to represent you, if you want the public defender to

1

represent you.

You have the right to have a preliminary

2

hearing and if, after that hearing, the Court finds there is

3

probable cause to believe you committed each of the offenses,

4

then you would be required, each or any of the offenses, then

5

you'd be required to enter a plea of either guilty, no contest,

6

or not guilty and have a speedy and public jury trial.

7

bail has presently been set at $60,500 which would be the

8

standard bail for this type of offense.

9

discuss bail any further?

10

MR. WEISKOPF:

11

THE COURT:

12

Did you wish to

Your Honor, he's felony on felony.

It's felony on felony so there would be

no bail available.

13

And are you going to enter as counsel?

14

MR. MARSHALL:

15

THE COURT: All right.

16

I'll defend it, yes, your Honor.
Do you want the public

defender to represent you in these matters, Mr. Garner?

17

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

18

THE COURT: All right. We'll set them for

19
20
21
22
23

The

preliminary hearing.
COURT CLERK:

We can set this January 2 at 2:00 with

Judge Heffernan.
MR. MARSHALL:

Your Honor, if view of the holidays

and the numerous counts, (inaudible).

24

THE COURT:

What date?

25

COURT CLERK:

January 2nd?

That's a week from today.

1
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4

THE COURT:

5

COURT CLERK:

6

991902255.

7

Go to number 21, Kelly Garner.
The State of Utah versus Kelly Garner,

This is the time set for a Preliminary Hearing.

MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Garner is here, your Honor.

8

the time set for a preliminary hearing.

9

to plead not guilty.

10

THE COURT:

This is

This will be a waiver

Thank you. Mr. Garner, you understand on

11

these felony matters that you have a right to a preliminary

12

hearing.

13

determine whether or not there is not a finding of guilt or

14

innocense, it's a determination if there is probable cause that

15

the crimes were committed and committed by you.

16

that preliminary hearing, the Court will have you arraigned.

17

You can then plead not guilty and we'll set the matter for

18

trial.

19

hearing, sir?

The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to

Okay?

Is it your desire now to waive your preliminary

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

that there is probable cause.

23

you.

24
25

COURT CLERK:
name?

If you waive

Yes, Sir.

The Court will accept the waiver and find
I'll ask the clerk to arraign

Is Kelly Garner your true and correct

1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.

2 I

COURT CLERK:

Count 1, you have been charged on or

3

about the 26th day of March, 1998, in Weber County, State of

4

Utah, with committing a third degree felony of burglary.

5

defendant entered and remained unlawfully in a building or in a

6

portion of a building at 860 West Riverdale Road, Number Dl,

7

with intent to commit a theft, a felony or commit an assault on

8

any person.

9

26th day of March, 1998, with a second degree felony which is

Said

Count 2, you have been charged on or about the

10

theft.

Said defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized

11

control of property at (inaudible) Pharmacy to wit:

12

pharmaceuticals of a value exceeding $5,000 with the purpose to

13

deprive the owner thereof.

14

or about the 26th day of March, 1998, with a third degree

Count 3, you have been charged on

15 J felony to wit: criminal mischief.

Said defendant intentionally

16 J damaged, defaced or destroyed the property of Senior Pharmacy,
17 I to wit: damage to alarm, locks, doors, and windows and caused
18

or intended to cause pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more but less

19

than $5,000.

20

19th day of February -

21

MR. GRAVIS:

Count 4, you have been charged on or about the

We'll waive the formal reading, Count 4

22

to reads the same as Count 1 except for the address and the

23

date.

24
25

THE COURT:
5.

Yes, the building at 3795 Kiesel. Count

1 \

MR. GRAVIS:

2

THE COURT:

3

Reads the same as Count 2 except for Except it's (inaudible) Pharmacy and it's

pharmaceuticals and cash.

4 I burglary.

Count 6 is a third degree felony

The address is at 1491 Ridgeline Drive.

5

a second degree theft.

6

wit: office equipment, computers, and (inaudible).

7

a third degree felony burglary.

Count 7 is

Property of First Security Mortgage to
Count 8 is

The building is located at

8 J 1770 Komby Road. Nine, is a third degree felony criminal
9 I mischief.

The property was Great Basin Dental and it was

10 I damage to doors, windows and telephone junction box.

Count 10

11 I is a Class B misdemeanor theft.
12 I

THE COURT:

To those counts how do you plead, Mr.

13 I Garner?
14

THE DEFENDANT:

15 !

THE COURT:

16

Not guilty.

The Court will accept the plea of not

guilty and will set the matter for trial.

17

MR. PARMLEY:

How much time?

It appears to be at least a three day

18

trial.

The Court should also be aware, your Honor, that the

19

defendant has been extradited, I believe from Arkansas

20

MR. GRAVIS: Alabama.

21

MR. PARMLEY:

Or Alabama, and there is a notice and a

22

request for disposition of informations that he appears to have

23

signed September 12. I don't know the date that that was

24

logged with the court in the State of Utah but from that date,

25

I believe that there's 180 days for the matter to be brought to

1
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MR. GRAVIS:

Can we got to number 19, Kelly Garner,

your Honor?

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. GRAVIS:

8

COURT CLERK:

9
10

I'm sorry, Mr. Gravis?
Number 19, Kelly Garner.
The State of Utah versus Kelly Garner,

991902255.
MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Garner is here, your Honor.

This is

11

set for pretrial.

12

Dismiss this on speedy trial grounds. As Mr. Parmley is aware,

13

I'm filing the motion and we're asking the Court to strike the

14

trial and reset it within 180 days, so we hope that the motion

15

is depositive but we want a backup trial date just in case.

16 I

THE COURT:

17 I correctly.
18

I will be filing tomorrow a Motion to

Now, let me see if I understand you

You want me to strike the trial?

MR. GRAVIS:

Yes.

Our motion is not on 180 day

19

disposition.

It's on the right to a speedy trial under the

20

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

21

our argument is is that the State has violated that even before

22

they placed the detainer on him.

23

MR. PARMLEY:

Basically

I was aware that Mr. Gravis was

24

preparing this motion that he's talking about.

We also talked

25

about how realistic it was to leave this trial date in place

1
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THE COURT:

This is a motion to dismiss.

The motion

5

is based upon the issues of a speedy trial which is the

6

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article

7

1 of the Constitution of Utah. There have been memorandums

8

filed in this matter. Mr. Gravis?

9

MR. GRAVIS:

Yes, your Honor.

I think there has been

10

a whole lot of dispute over the facts.

I'm not sure if we

11

necessarily agree that the State would have been in a better

12 I position to file after talking to defendant.

Supposedly, they

13

could have talk to him.

He would have talk to him.

But once

14

they knew that he wasn't in Davis County Jail and did come into

15 j talk to him they still could have filed substantially before
16

June of '99 since they basically had a full, a fairly complete

17

statement from the alleged co-defendant on May 5th of '98,

18

though she may have added to it over the months.

19

statement, I think, Mr. Parmley agreed, says that she did it

20

with the defendant, went through, it's an extensive, twenty

21

something, twenty plus pages, handwritten statement she gave on

22

March 5, I mean May 5th of '98. The State did not file until

23

June of '99.

24
25

That

In the meantime the defendant's mother died and what
the defendant tells me and that would be an issue of fact is

whether or not she would be, now he tells me that she would
testify that he couldn't have done these crimes because he was
there visiting at her house at the time these crimes were
occurring;

that she would testify that he was never out late

at night when these crimes occurred.

So we submit that as

actual prejudice. There's a two (inaudible) argument, their
delay prior, pre-filing delay is a due process argument on the
Fifth Amendment.

We do disagree with the State in that what

needed to be shown.

They've cited some cases, the Tenth

Circuit cases from the x80fs, Doggett says that the preindictment filing of the x92 cases for the due process you have
to show absolute prejudice, and the other things are the same
as for a speedy trial which is the reason for the delay and we
don't have show that the delay was intentional to gain
(inaudible) favorable position for the State.

We would submit

that negligence is also available in this case.
So, there is basically a year delay in filing from the
time they pretty much knew everything they needed to know to
file until they filed.

Like I say, they knew that the

defendant was in Davis County Jail.
arrested.

On April 18 he was

I'm not sure when exactly they knew we wasn't no

longer there.

He spent approximately thirty days there in

Davis County.

In fact, in May of *99 they knew he was in

Colorado.

They still didn't talk to him then.

In x99, when

they did subsequently file in June of x99. So, that's mine.

1

did do it when he was in Columbia, the United States Supreme

2 | Court did hold that against him.
3

Six years prior to the time he was arrested in the

4

United States, he comes back, the Government had notified the

5

Customs Department that if he comes back through customs, you

6

know, we've got a warrant out for him.

But he came back and

7 I went through Customs, wasn't stopped, got a college degree,
8 J worked, paid taxes.
9

The Supreme Court says, Hey, if you just

looked for him, he wasn't hiding, you could have found him.

10

It's negligence.

11

prejudice.

It's six times longer than the presumption of

Therefore, he's been denied his right to a speedy

12 J trial.
13

In this case, defendant, they knew where he was.

14

They knew he was in prison in Colorado in May of x99. They

15

didn't file a detainer.

16

from Colorado a detainer had been filed by Alabama.

17

he's getting ready to be paroled and they say, Hey, wait a

18

minute.

19

see what they want to do.

20

They file it in August of 2000.

21

notice of the detainer files his 180 day disposition on

22

detainers and the State still waits another three months before

23

they actually get him back here.

He doesn't show up here in

24

court until the 22nd of December.

So, ninety days of his 120

25

day disposition has already passed.

It's not until after he's released

We got a warrant out of Utah.

In Alabama

Let's contact them and

Does the State file a detainer?
The defendant, upon receiving

And they've offered no
4

1

excuse for it. Why didn't they, they offered no excuse why

2

they didn't file a detainer.

Doggett says, and I'm quoting:

3

"When the government's negligence does

4

cause six times as long as is generally

5

sufficient to figure judicial review, see

6 I

note 1 supra, and when the presumption of

7

prejudice, although unspecified is neither

8

extenuated as by the defendant's

9 I

acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted,

10

the defendant is entitled to relief."

11

So, the State hasn't performed their duty since the

12

State has not, that has agreed that he did not acquiesced to

13

the delay, they have an affirmative duty to show so rebut the

14

presumption of prejudice.

15

evidence to rebut that.

16

year when the presumption is attached, the presumption of

17

prejudice has attached, the State has made no effort to rebut

18

it, it's their obligation.

19

that.

20

as to why they didn't file a retainer while he was in Colorado

21

and why they didn't check to see what happened to him from May

22

until - of x98, until August of '90. I mean May of "99 of

23

August of 2000.

24

release this guy in November on parole.

25

warrant. What do you want us to do?

I submit that they have offered no

That period of time that one, past one

They have the burden of rebutting

They've presented nothing to rebut it. No explanation

It's only when they say, Hey, we're going to
You've got this

Do they think that they
5

1

even get around to filing the detainer.

2

talks about when they're negligent they simply say, it must be

3

that the government is not really that interested in

4

prosecuting.

5

They've known where, they didn't file when they could have.

6
7

The Supreme Court

I submit they're not really that interested.

Now the State will argue, well, we wanted to further
investigate but once they filed and they know where he's at,

8 j they have an obligation to do something about it and they
9 I neglected it.

Simply said, Hey, we don't really care.

We can

10

go get him in Colorado.

File a detainer, he files a 180

11

disposition, he's right there.

12

resolve the case.

13

He gets moved from Colorado to Alabama.

14

until they get notified, you know, if you don't want to do,

We can bring him back and

They don't do it.

They simply let it lay.
They simply let it lay

15 I basically, if you don't want to do anything, we're going to let
16

the guy out. And now they want to do something because he's

17

going to be out.

18

Garner his right to a speedy trial and we also submit they

19

denied him his right to due process on the pre-indictment

20

delay.

So, we'd submit that the State has denied Mr.

21

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Gravis.

22

Mr. Parmley?

23

MR. PARMLEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

Let me go ahead

24

and start with the due process part of this argument and that's

25

delay by the State once they've begun an investigation until
6

1

they actually file charges.

The defendant's claim is that he

2 I suffered actual prejudice because of that delay between May of
3 I 1998 and the filing of the informations in June of 1999 when he
4

was incarcerated in the Davis County Jail.

However, the Court

5

in Lavosco and Smith, the cases that have been cited, and made

6

it clear that the public prosecutor is not compelled to file

7

charges as soon as there is probable cause to do so. This

8

Court is well aware of the statute in Utah that reads that a

9

defendant cannot be convicted solely on the testimony of a co-

10 J conspirator which was essentially what this statement was in
11

May of 1998. They were trying to find corroborating evidence

12

to that. Also, Detective Ebert - and I have to do this by way

13

of proffer because he is not here - but he would say that when

14

the defendant was incarcerated in Davis County, they wanted to

15

interview him there.

16

he was gone. And, in fact, they didn't know where he had gone

17

but he was completely gone from the jurisdiction of the State

18

of Utah as far as we could tell and Detective Ebert simply

19

continued his investigation to the extent that he could,

20

continuing into 1999 and Mr. Gravis is correct that in May of

21

1999, and I shared this information with Mr. Gravis, we have a

22

note on our information approval for these charges saying

23

defendant is apparently incarcerated in prison in Colorado.

24

See what we need to do to bring him back.

25

Neider in May of June of 1999.

It was very, very shortly after that that

That was made by Ms.

1

So, I think that knowledge that he was incarcerated

2

in prison in Colorado has to be attributed to the State at that

3

point.

4

the reality is that this is not an egregious length of time for

5

an investigation to have been ongoing, number one, but number

6

two, the claim of actual prejudice that the defendant's mother

7

is no longer available because of her death is really somewhat

8

moot because she died in May of '97 and the very earliest - or

9

May of '98, I'm sorry.

10

MR. PARMLEY:

11

MR. GRAVIS: May of '98, and that's what I meant to

12

say.

I don't think there is any question about that. But

May of '98.

The very earliest the State could have even considered

13 I filing this was when they obtained the initial statement of the
14

co-conspirator in May of '98. And I think that Mr. Gravis will

15 I concede that there were additional interviews after that time
16 I and Detective Ebert - and this is a common practice to wait and
17

try to talk with the suspect before we jump in and file

18

charges. And that's partly because we want to get the other

19

side of the story before we necessarily jump to conclusions

20

that everything we understand from the other witnesses we've

21

talked to is the way it was.

22

So, as far as the due process argument, number one,

23

it was not an egregious period of time between the commencement

24

of the investigation of May of '98 and the filing of the

25

information in May of '99. The death of this apparent witness
8

1

would have made, if we had jumped in and filed as soon as we

2

had something, it wouldn't have made any difference because

3

that witness was already deceased.

4

Now, finally, the defendant wasn't available for an

5

interview because he, himself, was no longer in the

6

jurisdiction.

7

Going to the second issue, and I confess, I think

8

that's the more problematic issue before the Court and that's

9

the speedy trial issue. Mr. Gravis has suggested that Doggett

10

changed the law as set down in Barker vs. Wingo and the State's

11

case of State vs. Banks.

12

exactly and felt that this Court was still bound to consider

13

whether there's even a delay so extensive that it triggers the

14

need for judicial review. And in this case we concede that

15

there is (inaudible) of delay because it's just over a year,

16

approximately thirteen to fourteen months between the filing of

17

the informations and the time we lodge our detainer.

18

that I can say that our not lodging a detainer between June of

19

*98 and July or August of *99, when the defendant was

20

discovered in Alabama -

21

MR. GRAVIS:

22

MR. PARMLEY:

I didn't arrive at that conclusion

I think

2000.
All right, thank you, Mr. Gravis.

23

Between June of ^99 and between August of 2000 is simply

24

negligence, dereliction, whatever.

I don't have an explanation

25

and Mr. Gravis kept bring that up.

The State has not offered

1

problems or ongoing cases or whatever that after one year there

2

is a presumption that the rights of the defendant have been

3

violated under the constitution for a speedy trial and that

4

almost cannot be rebutted unless there are some extenuating

5

circumstances.

6
7

MR. GRAVIS:

No, I don't, like I say, it's not my job

to say what extenuating circumstances, the State has the burden

8 I of showing it and they, quite frankly, they've offered nothing.

;

I

9 I But -

!
i

10 I
11

THE COURT:

Let's assume they have nothing.

I mean

there does not, there doesn't appear to be anything except

12 J there is negligence.

|
j

But there doesn't appear to be anything,

13 I anything out there that I can see that 14 I
15

MR. GRAVIS:

I would submit the Doggett is even, this

case is even better than Doggett given that the time period is

16 I different because in Doggett they didn't know where the
17

defendant was and the Court says all you had to do was look and

18

you would have found him.

19

they knew where the defendant was but even before they filed

20

they knew.

21

knew where he was and they still did nothing.

22

That's the negligence.

In this case

So, it was not we don't know where he is. They

MR. PARMLEY:

And I guess what I'm still not clear

23

about is that they, see, we know in Banks and all that line of

24

cases, doesn't talk about this presumption of prejudice that

25

you're referring to Doggett and I'm not sure that that's the
19
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4

COURT CLERK:

5

The State of Utah versus Kelly Garner,

991902255, the (inaudible) for decision on page 9.

6

THE COURT:

Thank you. And Mr. Gravis is appearing.

7

MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Garner is here, your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

Thank you. Mr. Garner is present. Mr.

9 I Parmley is here for the State.
10

This matter has been briefed.

Subsequent to the briefing there was additional cases that were

11 j submitted by Mr. Parmley.

In addition to that, Mr. Gravis then

l

12 j submitted numerous cases to me.

I've had a chance to review

13

all of the material that was submitted to me although it was

14

lengthy and that was done some time ago, so don't challenge me

15

on any particular word in a case.

16

case was the case that was initially raised and I've had an

17

opportunity to review that and review that with some of the

18

other cases. And Doggett, of course was, and in the Doggett

19

case it talks about the necessity of (inaudible) pack,

20

sensitive case, sensitive in that case there was, as I recall,

21

about eight and a half years of a delay.

22

I think the, the Doggett

There is a case, the Beman case, and I don't remember

23

who submitted that to me, whether or not came - but that talks

24

about the dockets and the delays.

25

refers again to the, to what elements have to be met and,

In this case, the Court

1 I again, talks about it being very fact sensitive-

As I review

2 I that case I was much more similar to the time elements that
3 J were involved in this case.

I have tried to figure out how to

4 | deal with the issue that Mr. Gravis raised in that of his, of
5 J the availability of witnesses and that prejudice, particularly
6

the Mother who apparently is deceased and would have and could

7

have testified had the inability of or presented some alibi,

8

however, I don't have any record of that.

I don't have any way

9 I to determine that other than based upon the representations, I
10

don't have that, that fact before me.

I am, I've looked at

11

the, I don't think this case falls into the category of

12 I violation of speedy trial based upon the cases that I have read
13 J and I deny the motion.
14 I

MR. GRAVIS:

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. GRAVIS: Are you finding the fourteen month or a

17

twenty month delay?

Clarify it.

Well, I think the case law I submitted it

18 I subsequent would say the delay is from the date of the filing
19

of the information to the trial date not to the time he's

20

brought, first brought before the court.

21
22

THE COURT:

right on the mind, Mr. Gravis, what the -

23
24
25

I don't, I don't, I'm not, I don't have .

MR. GRAVIS:

The information was filed, I believe, on

June 7 THE COURT:

In fact, I have in my mind that it was

arguments at the time that he lost his parole date and we
agreed that the facts were not in question.

That we had

stipulated to all the facts including that.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Was that, is that a fact?

Then

that goes into the findings of fact.
MR. PARMLEY:

I have not stipulated to that but I

didn't have any reason to dispute that.

I don't know how it

was that it came to the agency's attention that they lost the
detainer.

Mr. Gravis said that it was as a result of the

hearing in Alabama.

And I don't have any reason to know

otherwise, your Honor, that could very well be.
THE COURT: Mr. Parmley, is you'll prepare the
findings of fact and if you'll look at those, Mr. Gravis, and
make sure that you have any facts that you want listed in that
finding of facts so that's preserved.
MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, I don't know, I don't show

on my file that we have a further pretrial set.
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:
pretrial.

We don't.
It may be beneficial to set a further

Mr. Parmley and I have talked about a possible

resolution, reserving the right to appeal your decision today.
THE COURT:

Certainly.

MR. GRAVIS: And I think we'd like, there is some
things that we need to iron out.
THE COURT:

But the case needs to be resolved.

I
4
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MR. LAKER:

That would be number 7, your, or 19,

excuse me, your Honor, on page 7.
COURT CLERK:
THE COURT:

That is Kelly Garner.

Oh, Kelly Garner.

Number 25?

COURT CLERK:

The State of Utah vs. Kellv Garner,

991902255, the time set for a pretrial. (Inaudible).
MR. PARMLEY:

He was and I think that I've got this,

(inaudible) I think we've got it worked out, your Honor.
COURT CLERK:

Okay.

THE COURT: Mr. Garner is present and Mr. Laker,
you're appearing here this morning with him?
MR. LAKER:

Yes, I am, your Honor.

We have arrived

at an agreement on it.
MR. PARMLEY:
right with Mr. Laker.

Well, I can state that if that's all
There is a approximately a fifteen count

information before the Court and the - or a ten count.

The

defendant right now is serving a prison term in Alabama.

We

have him here in Utah to try and come to a final disposition on
these pending charges. What we've agreed is that the defendant
would be entering a plea of guilty to four counts of burglary,
a third degree felony, one, four, eight and six. All of the
remaining counts would be dismissed.

Furthermore, the State

has agreed that we have information as to some other burglaries
in Weber County that occurred during this same period of time.
I believe that Mr. Gravis is aware that those businesses are,
as referred to in the reports, we're agreeing we're not going
to pursue any prosecution of any of those other matters. We
would then move to dismiss all the other pending charges upon
the defendant's plea of guilty.

And we would then further

recommend that the Court sentence on these charges here in Utah
be zero to five years, all concurrent with each other and
concurrent with the terms that the defendant is serving in
Alabama and what we mean by that that we really do contemplate
that the defendant, we're not asking Alabama to enlarge or
lengthen the time the defendant serves in Alabama by virtue of
our convictions here. We're just asking the commitment can
just run concurrent with whatever Alabama is doing and we're
asking that the minute entry or order of commitment reflect
that that is the negotiation.
MR. LAKER:

With some specificity so that they

understand that specifically.
THE COURT:

You will be drafting it.

MR. PARMLEY:

That we would be returned to Alabama

and complete his terms there and then we're stipulating to a
figure of $10,840 restitution that would become part of his
parole agreement in Alabama for the victims in our cases here
in Utah.

We've also agreed that the defendant can reserve his
2

right to appeal the Court's decision on the speedy trial issues
that the Court has previously heard.
Is that the extent of the agreement?
MR. LAKER:

That's the extent of the agreement. I

think it would behoove us to get some clarification on the
Court's ruling with regard to the speedy trial issue.
Specifically what areas the Court found lacking as far as the
analysis on the Harper vs. Wingle analysis.
MR. PARMLEY:

Well, at this point I think we need to

forward with the (inaudible).
THE COURT:
there.

If you're going to give what you've got

I mean, I'm not, we've done that COURT CLERK:

(Inaudible) There is already an order.

(Inaudible)
MR. PARMLEY:

The Court has asked the State to

prepare findings (both talking).
THE COURT:

Prepare that and then you'll have a

chance to review that then you'll have a chance to review that
and the Court will sign that so you'll have that specific
order, Mr. Garner, and then you can decide whether or not to
take that up.
THE DEFENDANT:
clarification.

Okay, as far as a little bit of

I'm not actually still serving my original

sentence in Alabama.

I'm back on a parole violation for a

trespass charge and because they understood that I was arrested
3

1

and 8?

Is that, have I got the right numbers?

2

MR. LAKER:

That's correct, your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Garner, are you with us?

Is

4 I that what we're going to do?
5

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

6 I

THE COURT: We're going to preserve your right to

7 I appeal based upon some findings that is going to be submitted
8 | by the State.
9
LO

If you want further specificity of the sentence

that the Court is going to impose after this then you'll need
to submit that in writing.

.1 I that to the Court.

Mr. Gravis or Mr. Laker can submit

It will need to be approved by the County

2 I Attorney's office and then I'll take a look at it and sign
3 ! that, if appropriate, which may assist in anything to do with
4 ! Alabama.

Okay?

5 !

THE DEFENDANT:

6 I

THE COURT: All right.

Okay.
Let me go through your rights

7

with you so that I know that you understand them and that

}

you're entering a plea knowingly and voluntarily.

I would

) I first advise you that you have the right against self
incrimination.

You don't have to say or do anything that will

incriminate you.
these counts.

That means you do not have to plead guilty to

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do.

You need to understand that you have a

right to a jury trial and that at trial you could call

1
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COURT CLERK:

4
5

991902255.
THE COURT:

6
7
8
9

The State of Utah vs. Kelly Garner,

This is the time set for sentencing. Mr.

Gravis?
MR. GRAVIS:

Yes, your Honor.

One thing that we'd

talked about and I wasn't here last time but from what I

10

understand the State was going to prepare a written letter and

11

Mr. Parmley didn't get the note to send back with Mr. Garner

12

explaining their recommendation that he not do any additional

13 I time in Alabama as a result of these charges and Mr. Parmley,
14

like I say, didn't get the information and the letter is not

15

done so we'd ask to continue this one more week so Mr. Parmley

16

can look -

17

THE COURT:

Let me tell you how I think this is going

18

to best resolved to follow through with the agreement that has

19

been entered into.

20

recommendations from the Department of Corrections that I

21

impose the prison sentence in Utah;

22

with the State of Alabama and allow them, impose the

23

restitution.

24

you and that you'll be taken back to Alabama and that would be

25

the concurrency.

I think that the, and I based upon this by

that I run that concurrent

Then I understand that Alabama will come and get

If you're placed on probation with Alabama or

if you're let out on parole in Alabama, then if you're going to
come here, you'd be under some kind of a pact but the
Department of Corrections would retain jurisdiction, now, I
think meets with the intent is what was attempted to be.
MR. GRAVIS:

That does except for the part that the

State would also further agreed to Alabama that they not give
him any additional time.
MR. PARMLEY:

We had agreed that we would send a

letter to the - and I'm not sure who the person would be.
Would it be the woman that you and I both talked to, do you
think?
MR. GRAVIS:

I think she'd be the one, yeah.

MR. PARMLEY:

Probably.

We agreed that we would send

a letter to them letting them know specifically that we weren't
asking them to extend his time there as a result of our
convictions here and I was just intending to send a letter
after he was sentenced.

But if they want me to prepare the

letter so they can see a copy of it, that's fine.
THE COURT:
moving.

Well, let's get it done so it starts

I mean let's get the sentence imposed and let's get

him down there so Alabama can be notified.

The letter can be,

that's part of the Order.
MR. GRAVIS:

He'll go to prison and then he'll be

transferred from the prison.

That way (inaudible) probation

department, they can get him to Alabama faster.

